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In his final days as the Director of the Hookworm Commission in Jamaica, Dr. P.E. 
Gardner wrote to his superior Hector Howard about his experience in setting up the first public 
health demonstration campaign on the island. He lamented, “… it has seemed to me at times that 
my best efforts had produced very poor results ... It was not a satisfactory piece of work to me 
and at the same time it was the most difficult piece of work I have ever done.”1 Gardner was the 
second official from the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health (IHB) to take up work on 
the island since the arrival of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) in 1918. He shared the pessimism 
of his predecessor Dr. M.E. Connor,
2
 who held out little hope that the efforts of IHB in Jamaica 
would bear any fruit.  
Despite the high hopes of Howard and the IHB’s Director, Wickliffe Rose, that Jamaica 
would become the centerpiece of public health work in the Caribbean, the first two years of the 
work were disappointing and challenging. The commencement of public health work in Jamaica 
was all the more urgent because IHB’s other campaigns in the Caribbean, begun several years 
earlier, had mostly stalled out, due to a lack of manpower or failed attempts to win the public and 
governments to the cause of investment in public health. Through the correspondence records 
and official reports of IHB officials in Jamaica the Rockefeller Archive Center’s (RAC) 
collection reveals in striking detail the challenges faced by Gardner, Connor, and Howard in 
creating and sustaining a program of public health in Jamaica between 1918 and 1920. Despite 
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assurances from high officials, Howard and Gardner discovered that the government would not 
meet the terms of their agreement, costing the RF time and money, and frequently, the good will 
of the Jamaican people. While the IHB would eventually flourish in Jamaica, with a presence on 
the island until 1944, their first foray on the island was fraught with difficulty and almost ended 
as soon as it began.  
Although the IHB began work in the British Caribbean in 1914 in British Guiana and 
quickly expanded into Trinidad and other locations throughout the circum-Caribbean, they had 
not committed to Jamaica, one of the most populous British possessions in the region, until 1918. 
Jamaica was certainly of interest to the IHB and was described in a letter from the Caribbean 
Director Hector Howard
3
 as, “… the largest and most important British Colony in the West 
Indies and offer[s] opportunity for a most impressive demonstration ...”4 This reluctance to begin 
work on the island, visited by Howard in 1915,
5
 was largely due to concerns about the 
organization of the island’s government and the recognition that they would not be able to 
arrange control of sanitation to their satisfaction. By 1918 the central government and the 
Governor Sir William Henry Manning were so impressed by the IHB’s work in other parts of the 
Caribbean that they eagerly promised to meet their conditions for work on the island.  
The focus on hookworm as a “wedge” for public health efforts has been widely discussed 
in the scholarship on the IHB. Both Steven Palmer (who examined the very first international 
health programs in the circum-Caribbean) and John Farley agree that hookworm was selected as 
a disease because it afforded the opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of minor public health 
investment. The first IHB director, Wickliffe Rose, was interested in using a single disease as a 
wedge by which IHB could show that investment in sanitation, clear record keeping, and public 
education could have a tremendous effect on mortality and morbidity. Hookworm was an 
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appropriate disease for this effort because it was caused by contact with filth (the worms entered 
the body through bare feet in contact with contaminated soil); the worms were just visible to the 
naked eye and were satisfyingly monstrous under the microscope and there was a clear course of 
treatment which rendered almost immediate relief from the anemia-induced fatigue associated 
with hookworm infection. Moreover, as Palmer has argued, almost every medical culture already 
associated worms with sickness and a variety of vermifuges and incipient treatment programs 
already existed. Finally, hookworm infection affected both laborers, who faced reduced wages 
due to fatigue, and employers whose sick workers cost them in efficiency and profit.  
Hookworm infection was certainly known in Jamaica prior to the IHB’s arrival in 1918. 
District Medical Officers,
6
 tasked with overseeing the health of the inhabitants of their district, 
were paid by the government to administer hookworm treatments from dispensaries. While these 
treatments might offer temporary relief from symptoms of fatigue, without better sanitation 
patients inevitably became re-infected, costing the state money. The “intensive method” 
pioneered by the IHB in British Guiana and other parts of the Caribbean offered a permanent 
solution to hookworm infection. It dramatically altered the scale of the public health apparatus 
and its interaction with the population by instituting a regime of surveillance, documentation and 
education that surpassed even the scrutiny of the plantation during the era of slavery. What the 
IHB brought to Jamaica was an approach to public health that promised, and frequently 
delivered, unprecedented access to health resources in exchange for surrender of control over 
one’s body to the IHB’s disciplined regime of sanitation. The intensive method was an 
introduction to the IHB’s particularly American brand of public health.  
As Palmer argues in his study of the earliest IHB programs in the circum-Caribbean, the 
IHB’s intensive method paralleled the American approach to imperialism and differed from the 
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British system of colonialism in significant ways. The first was that the IHB wanted and 
expected to leave a country once their system of public health had been thoroughly adopted by 
the home country. In contrast, British colonial public health was rooted in the constant oversight 
and daily contact that had governed the slave plantation, and was translated into the sugar fields 
and banana plantations populated by free laborers. Through this intensive method the IHB hoped 
to effect a dramatic transformation in sanitation and the health of the population and win the 
backing of the government and the resident medical community, and then the IHB could leave 
knowing that their public health programs would receive continued funding and support from the 
local staff who had received training from the IHB.  
 In service of this goal, the IHB always chose to embed its campaigns in the apparatus of 
the local health system. For example, in Jamaica, the Director of the Hookworm Campaign was a 
part of the Island Medical Service and was officially subordinate to the Superintending Medical 
Officer. Moreover, the second in command and all of the staff: microscopists, clerks, nurses (all 
male) and sanitary inspectors, were all drawn from the Jamaican community. The IHB hoped to 
train a critical mass of young men in the American-style of public health and leave the island 
with a capable and invested cadre to carry on their work. In addition, as part of the contract that 
the IHB had with the Jamaican government, the funding of the Hookworm Commission would 
be gradually transferred from the IHB to the central government. Rather than setting up a 
permanent presence on the island as might be expected of an institution reflecting an ambitious 
young imperial power, IHB worked to expand its influence in more indirect ways: a 
sophisticated form of soft power that contrasted with the deliberately imperialist and military 
conquests of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines by the United States government.  
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Following an initial survey to estimate hookworm infection rates, the intensive method 
was implemented in each area targeted by the IHB. First, a team of workers, led by an IHB 
medical officer conducted a thorough survey of each individual and household, creating a 
gridded map of every house in the target area. To encourage cooperation, education work was 
done prior to the arrival of the survey team. This might include lectures with lantern slides, a 
public health film, or the posting of bills in public spaces. IHB staff also sought the support of 
local religious leaders, politicians, and educators. To determine infection, stool samples were 
collected from every person and deposited in tin cans. Next a microscopist, a trained person 
chosen from the island, would examine the samples for worms or eggs. Once a patient was 
identified as having any level of infection, the IHB doctor, who oversaw the hookworm 
campaign, would administer one of two powerful anti-helminthic drugs.
7
 The ingestion of the 
drug was accompanied by a purgative to avoid potentially life-threatening complications. 
Finally, in a follow-up visit, a staff member would collect and examine a second stool sample to 
determine if the patient was now worm-free. This method assured with a high degree of certainty 
that nearly every infected individual in the target area was identified and treated. Theoretically, 
the cycle of infection could be stopped if everyone in a given area was cured and did not pass 
any more worms in their excrement. However, the biggest obstacle to the eradication of the 
disease remained.
8
  
After their work in Trinidad and British Guiana in particular, the IHB staff learned that 
attempting to conduct treatment campaigns while simultaneously building latrines and other 
forms of sanitation was a losing proposition. Once patients began to feel better and employers 
saw an increase in productivity, it became difficult to encourage investment in the building of 
latrines and re-infection became inevitable, which was a blemish on the IHB record. By the time 
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they reached Jamaica pre-sanitation was a non-negotiable condition for hookworm treatment 
campaigns.  
Hector Howard, the director of operations for the Caribbean, visited Jamaica in early 
1918, and after speaking with Governor Manning, the Superintending Medical Officer (SMO) 
Dr. Errington Ker, and both elected and nominated members of the Legislative Council, won the 
support of the island’s leaders to begin hookworm work. Howard and the Board of Directors 
were quite specific in the terms of their agreement with the government. This caution reflected 
the lessons learned in other parts of the globe since the commencement of IHB work in 1913. 
They first stipulated that a Sanitation Department be organized under a Chief Sanitary Officer at 
an initial cost of £7000. The government was also expected to provide £2500 (approximately 
$12,000) for drugs and stationary, and, “… that the sanitary work will begin with the survey, and 
if relief measures should be undertaken the areas in which the work is to be done will be 
sanitized in advance of the examination and treatment of the people.”9 On March 28, 1918 the 
Legislative Council, with the Governor’s approval, passed a measure inviting the IHB to begin 
hookworm work and agreed to a budget of £2000 for the first year. Howard expressed some 
concern to Rose that they had not received an official letter from the Governor, but only an 
informal communication from SMO Ker. Rose and the Board in New York agreed that the 
passing of the measure for the budget and the invitation from Ker were enough to proceed with 
the survey. This lack of definitive language would be costly in the future when a conflict erupted 
on the island over which governmental body had jurisdiction over sanitation.  
In Governor Manning the IHB had found a passionate, but temporary, advocate for their 
work. Manning’s speech to the Legislative Council in March 1918 summed up the need for pre-
sanitation as follows, “In other words, as long as free and unchecked pollution of the soil is 
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allowed to continue, there can be no hope that the development of the Hookworm can be arrested 
as a polluted soil means the unchecked spread of the disease.” He also explained to the Council 
that, “It is the practice of the International Health Board … to operate through existing 
Government Agencies as far as possible,” and consequently sanitation would be placed under the 
control of a superintending inspector who, “would be responsible to the Government alone 
through the Central Board of Health.” This was meant to address a specific recommendation of 
the Superintending Medical Officer of the Island Medical Service (the head of public health on 
the island), Howard to Ker in early 1918: that the Sanitary Inspector has authority over the Local 
Boards of Health and be the main person with whom the IHB would communicate and work. It 
was a position crucial to IHB’s success in Jamaica.10 Finally, Manning ordered that the Local 
Boards of Health should continue to be financially responsible for sanitary construction, 
although this did not include private residences. The Governor suggested that Central 
Government should foot the bill for the construction of latrines in homes where the residents 
were unable to afford the expensive facilities.  
This speech, which was adopted without change by the Legislative Council, had three 
important elements for the future of public health in Jamaica. First, he strongly affirmed IHB’s 
stance that pre-sanitation was a pre-requisite to the success of any hookworm campaign and that 
a sanitary latrine system, “must be necessarily be (sic) installed before any satisfactory results 
can be expected from medical treatment.”  Second, he clearly established that the Central Board 
of Health, whose members were appointed by the Governor, and the Chief Sanitary Inspector, 
had authority over Local Boards of Health, who were elected by the people. He also delineated, 
in somewhat vague terms, that Local Boards of Health were largely responsible for the 
construction of sanitation in their parish, with some help from Central Government to aid the 
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very poor. Finally, he explained that the IHB would be operating within the apparatus of the 
colonial government with the IHB leading the treatment campaign and making all decisions 
about where the work would be carried out.   
Dr. M.E. Connor was selected to conduct the initial infection survey. He arrived in 
Jamaica in June 1918, and completed the survey by September of that same year. Howard and 
Rose believed that Jamaica was too important to entrust to a new recruit and Connor had years of 
previous experience in Central America.
11
 Connor was able to recruit government agencies to the 
survey work and Howard was pleased that this, stating, “I will identify the Government with the 
work in its early stages, which is worth while (sic).”12 Connor used District Constables to collect 
the tins of feces, lending the survey the legitimacy and power of the police force.
13
 However, he 
later revealed to Rose after the survey was finished that he had trouble with the Chief Constable 
who believed that the delivery and collection of feces was below the dignity of his officers. 
Connor explained that when he approached the officers directly he was able to get cooperation, 
but when they knew the chief’s views they would not help. He suggested that if the governor let 
the chief know his support for the hookworm campaign, the IHB directors could gain the 
valuable help of the constabulary.
14
 
Connor’s report, “Hookworm Infection Survey of Jamaica (June 14-July 31, 1918),” 
became the basis for deciding where the hookworm campaign should begin. Fatefully, Connor 
and Howard agreed that Clarendon Parish should be the first area targeted for the intensive 
method.  The reasons for the selection of the May Pen area of Clarendon were enumerated by 
Connor and SMO Ker. Many of the reasons given had little to do with scientific or public health 
considerations, such as level of infection, but rather with the need to garner support for the 
campaign from government officials. This tends to reinforce the view that demonstration, rather 
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than eradication, was the focus of the Hookworm Commission for IHB. May Pen was located 
near the rail line and was easily accessible from Kingston and in close reach of officials. Connor 
argued that, “This point should be given due weight, as many of the officials are still skeptical 
regarding the proposed campaign … Their impressions will determine the future of sanitation in 
the island.”15  
A second consideration was that the May Pen area was made up of large plantations and 
during his survey Connor had found higher rates of infection on the sugar and banana plantations 
which formed the backbone of the island’s economy. One result of this survey was to build 
support for the IHB with many of the planter class and the American-owned United Fruit 
Company, who already had a medical staff on their plantations in the May Pen area. Finally, 
Connor and Ker reported that the district of May Pen and the parish of Clarendon were eager and 
interested in hookworm work, assuring greater cooperation in this first and most crucial 
campaign. Connor acknowledged to Howard that Clarendon Parish did not have a high rate of 
infection, but he argued that the guarantee of cooperation outweighed the choice of a parish with 
higher rates of infection, but a weaker prospect of interest and cooperation from the local 
government.
16
 This promised cooperation would prove important in the subsequent struggle over 
authority when his successor, P.E. Gardner arrived in 1919. 
  Connor also offered further observations on conditions in Jamaica in a remarkably 
unguarded 1918 memo to his superiors in New York. Because this memo, which is only five 
pages long, but so filled with his impressions, and frank and revealing of the assumptions under 
which the IHB men operated, it is entirely worthwhile going into some depth at this point. In this 
informal report Connor offered advice for those who came after him and explained the best ways 
to avoid the pitfalls of working in another culture.  
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Connor explained that some, but not all parishes had a Medical Officer of Health (MOH), 
in addition to the District Medical Officers (DMO), who made suggestions to the Local Boards 
of Health about matters of sanitation, although they had no enforcement powers. Moreover, there 
were few funds allocated for sanitary inspections and, “… the position of medical officer of 
health is more or less of a sinecure and the official appointed for political reasons.” However, 
Connor warned that the IHB director in Jamaica must approach these MOH’s and get their 
cooperation for the hookworm campaigns. Foreshadowing many of the conflicts to come, 
Connor underscored the tensions between the Parochial Boards and the Superintending Medical 
Officer writing, “There is considerable feeling between,” them, and that while the SMO could 
appeal to the governor for ultimate authority, they rarely did, and the governors were 
uninterested in rocking the boat by legislating against the wishes of the Parish Boards.
17
   
Connor advised that in order for the IHB director to be successful he needed to get the 
political members of the parishes behind them. These included the member elected from each 
parish to the Legislative Council, the Custos and the privy counselor. Connor remarked that, “… 
if they are in sympathy with a project, that project goes ahead more rapidly and smoothly than it 
would if they were out of sympathy with it.”18 According to Connor, it was also important for 
IHB officials to become friendly or win the support of the head dispensers of the government 
hospitals in order to gain community cooperation and support. He explained that the dispenser 
had become an important position because DMO’s generally neglected their hospital duties and 
left the dispenser to actually prescribe drugs and treat patients. Connor warned that without the 
support of the dispenser, who he alluded to as someone looking out for personal and professional 
prestige, the work would suffer because, “… he is capable of interfering and even blocking the 
work by spreading false reports amongst the more ignorant of the population.” Moreover, the 
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DMO’s had little control over the dispensers because they received their pay directly from the 
Legislative Council and cultivated support with the local elected member.
19
 
  Connor also offered some revealing observations on race in Jamaica. He reported that of 
the estimated nine hundred thousand people in Jamaica, only five thousand, “were pure white.” 
Connor “found that there is intense race feeling in the island, which is fostered and kept alive by 
the so-called ‘colored population’ who uses its prejudices for their own ends.” It is probably 
correct to assume that Connor was here specifically referring to the mixed-race members of the 
Legislative Council elected from the small middle class. This is because they opposed attempts 
to subsume authority for sanitation under a central authority and this was a constant thorn in the 
IHB officer’s side in their first several years in Jamaica.20 Connor warned that IHB officers 
should expect to sleep in the house of “natives” while traveling throughout the island, but 
explained that most were hospitable. Connor suggested that the island’s ministers were important 
potential allies once they were won over by demonstrations of the hookworm treatment, because 
they were highly competitive and, “ever on the alert to increase his congregation.” He also 
suggested that the school teachers could be reached through their ministers and plantation 
owners.  
Connor warned that opposition might arise from anti-American plantation owners, one of 
whom, Sir Ransford Slater, caught the ear of Governor Leslie Probyn and caused some problems 
for IHB directors Gardner and Washburn in the early 1920s. In addition, Connor revealed that 
while some doctors on the island might publically support the IHB’s hookworm campaign, 
privately they could not be counted upon, because they were either skeptical of the intensive 
method or they refused to demonstrate to the lower classes that they would take part in the 
campaign by submitting stool samples. Connor explained that, “the lower classes are guided by 
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the utterances and actions of those who should guide them into the right channels.” In contrast, 
where Connor received the support of local medical authorities, he had almost total cooperation 
and collected large numbers of specimens.
21
  
Finally, in two separate communications Connor suggested that the IHB man who took 
over the campaign be given some latitude as, “Conditions in Jamaica are rapidly changing, more 
especially with reference to labor.”22 This was in reference to his concerns that all terms of 
employment with “natives”23 be written clearly down in order to avoid confusion or tension. 
Connor urged that before a microscopist was brought on he should sign a contract concerning the 
terms of his employment. This was to guard against potential trouble over pay, and termination. 
Connor explained that, “The strong card in Jamaica is for the native to get the elected member 
(of the Legislative Council) to write the Governor in his behalf, and the English custom is to give 
the native the benefit of the doubt … and as you know the press will take the side of the native in 
every instance against the white man.” This intriguing statement reveals much about both the 
politics of race in Jamaica and the racial biases of Connor and Howard.  
Palmer, in Launching Global Health, describes Howard showing a disdain for the work 
of Afro-Guianese and Afro-Trinidadians in his prior IHB work. Most of the IHB men who came 
to Jamaica were from the Southern United States and worked in constant and close contact with a 
local staff made up almost entirely of Afro-Jamaicans. Connor’s implicit disdain for the 
patronage system employed by “natives” in order to further their careers or in search of redress 
for wrongs was echoed by many of the IHB staff in Jamaica. It illuminates both a suspicion of 
the colonial system of government and a disregard for the professional and social barriers faced 
by educated and able men and women of color within the racial hierarchy of Jamaican society.  
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Following Connor’s departure, the work of the Hookworm Commission properly began 
with the arrival of P.E. Gardner from his three year hookworm stint in St. Vincent. He arrived in 
January 1919 to begin his work. Unfortunately, despite assurances from Governor Manning and 
SMO Ker that sanitation would be completed in May Pen, Gardner arrived to discover that not 
only was the sanitation barely begun, but a battle was brewing between the central government 
and the local Parochial Boards over the control of health and sanitation on the island. Gardner 
learned that despite the 1918 agreement, the Central Board of Health (BOH) in reality had only 
advisory powers over sanitation. After the Superintending or Chief Sanitary Inspector and his 
subordinates conducted a house to house survey of sanitary conditions, they would report any 
unsatisfactory dwellings to the Local Board of Health. It was then up to the local Sanitary 
Inspector to serve notice and the Local BOH to enforce any fines on households.
24
 This meant, in 
effect, that little or no sanitary work was carried out prior to Gardner’s arrival and that his 
protests and exhortations to the central government were constantly deferred to Local BOH’s, 
who in turn claimed poverty.  
Gardner and his staff spent the next few months helping May Pen catch up. When the 
treatment campaign began on May 1, 1919, sanitation was still not completed, but Gardner was 
facing increasing pressure to do something and started the treatment work despite his grave 
concerns. He did this in part because the Chief Sanitary Inspector, Dr. Oliver Crosswell, assured 
him that by the time the treatment campaign began, he would have the remaining fifty percent of 
the construction complete. This inauspicious start also signaled the beginning of a contentious 
relationship between Gardner and Crosswell that brought larger issues of governmental authority 
and the battle between local parish government and the central government to the foreground. 
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In the records of the Jamaica campaign, Crosswell becomes a recurring figure, and it is 
worthwhile to briefly describe how his appointment came to be such a point of annoyance for 
Gardner and his successor Dr. Benjamin Washburn. Following the 1918 agreement by the 
government to elect a Chief Sanitary Officer to oversee the pre-sanitation of the May Pen  
district, the Acting Colonial Secretary appointed Crosswell to the position.
25
 The IHB privately 
preferred Dr. R.S. Turton, and he had been offered the position prior to Crosswell.
26
 The IHB 
staff had strong objections to Crosswell,
27
 believing that he had little interest in the methods 
employed by the IHB in the construction of latrines, the surveying of sanitary conditions, and the 
implementation of the work with efficiency and haste. Despite these objections, and after a 
vigorous debate in which several of the elected leaders on the council argued that when Turton 
was first offered the position he was late in accepting it, and Crosswell was given the post 
instead.
28
 However, this slight personnel issue became a public scandal, because Crosswell 
secured counsel and threatened to sue the government for breach of contract.  
By January 1919, just prior to Gardner’s arrival, Crosswell received his commission, but 
this inauspicious start soon grew into frustration and animosity between Gardner and Crosswell, 
and interfered with the sanitation of the first districts selected for demonstration campaigns. In 
this small example, the importance of local actors became central to the success of the RF’s 
global health initiative. In fact, the deteriorating relationship with Crosswell became a central 
fact of the campaign, leading to costly delays, poor results and IHB staff so exasperated that the 
public health work in Jamaica was almost terminated. Had the IHB men been able to win over 
Crosswell, many of the other obstacles to their work, including the continuing battle between the 
Local BOH’s and the Central BOH for authority over sanitation, would have been more easily 
overcome.
29
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Moreover, the selection of May Pen, recommended by Connor for the reasons discussed 
above, proved to be a poor decision for a first campaign location. Gardner, unable to secure 
living accommodations in the May Pen area, traveled every day by rail from Kingston, as did 
many of the staff. Although the settlements were called “villages,” the population, which was 
made up of ninety percent Afro-Jamaican agricultural laborers, was scattered along the roadside 
for miles, making the census and outreach to every dwelling a challenge for the campaign staff.
30
 
More importantly, it was found once the campaign began that infection rates were around fifty 
percent, rather than the estimated eighty percent reported by Connor in his 1918 survey. This 
meant that the potential for May Pen to serve as a demonstration area to show the effectiveness 
of treatment was severely limited. Despite these setbacks, his staff of four microscopists, four 
nurses, (this number was expanded to six by the end of 1919) and two “caretakers,” spent the 
first weeks training in the techniques of hookworm detection and distributing handbills with 
educational material to villagers. Gardner conducted one public lecture with lantern slides, in 
order to encourage cooperation once the collection of samples began. Gardner reported that in 
the first month of work, including the collection of samples, little resistance was encountered and 
he mentioned that many of the villagers were, “anxious to be treated,” although in Gardner’s 
assessment, they were also passive and indifferent to adopting permanent measures in 
sanitation.”31 
Gardner was severely disappointed with the sanitation work that had already been carried 
out, finding only one or two latrines in each of the five villages that met IHB standards.
32
 He 
described many of the existing latrines as being constructed from scraps of board and of very 
temporary construction.
33
 Despite his many disappointments in the first months, there were some 
highlights. Gardner was able to garner public support in Kingston giving a lantern slide lecture to 
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many of the island’s leading lights, including the Governor and the Imperial Agricultural 
Association, a group of prominent members of the planter class. He also distributed copies of 
“Hookworm Catechism” a pamphlet developed in the American South and used in other West 
Indian campaigns for school children. Public support and attendance upon a lecture did not 
translate to success in the field however, and Gardner’s problems with Chief Sanitary Inspector 
Crosswell became an increasingly significant obstacle. By mid-1919 Gardner was despairing of 
the sanitation situation, writing to Howard, “With their organization as it exists at present, I do 
not believe that they will ever get results.”34 
The staff of the hookworm campaign found the population in May Pen to be almost 
universally, “indifferent to the work.”35 In his 1919 annual report, Gardner attributed this lack of 
interest and enthusiasm to the overlap between the sanitation campaign and the treatment 
campaign. He argued that the sometimes coercive measures taken during the sanitation campaign 
tended to raise “ill feeling” and passive resistance to the subsequent treatment campaign. For this 
reason, Gardner and his successor, Washburn, demanded that all sanitation work be carried out 
before the arrival of the IHB staff, as had been originally stipulated in the 1918 contract between 
the IHB and the Jamaican government.  
In frustration, Gardner attempted to work through the Central Board of Health and the 
Governor to force the Clarendon Parish Board (who were also the Local BOH) to complete 
sanitation in the May Pen area in September 1919 and used the proposed second campaign in the 
plantation district of Vere as a lever to get action. Quoting a communication from Howard, 
Gardner wrote to the CBOH, “I am to enquire if this district, May Pen, is to be sanitated (sic) as 
agreed or if the work is to lapse and the conditions remain so unsatisfactory. I am to enquire also 
upon what grounds we may be justified in expecting better results in sanitation in the next district 
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that has been selected than has been secured in the May Pen district.”36 This somewhat pointed 
set of comments, directed through Gardner and conveyed by the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of 
the Governor and the Central Board of Health, to the Parish Board members, was no doubt a 
stinging rebuke. At a meeting of the local BOH in mid-September, Crosswell asked the Board to 
hire additional men to complete his work and received at least verbal confirmation. 
Despite his publically stated support for hookworm work in Clarendon, Crosswell’s own 
frustration or perhaps indifference surfaced in a conversation with the Clarendon board just a few 
weeks earlier. He subtly undermined the work of the IHB when he told the members of the 
Board that, “It is not the intention of the Rockefeller people to complete any country; they carry 
out experimental areas and then leave the local government to finish up.” To which one Board 
member replied, “Then it is a dead thing, just as well to chuck it up.”37 Crosswell’s comment and 
the subsequent response by the Board indicates a further problem encountered by Gardner, and 
later Washburn. The IHB men had to constantly remind Jamaican officials that they were there to 
conduct demonstration campaigns, in specific districts. The IHB was not going to cover every 
inch of a parish, though they would be thorough in the district selected for the intensive method, 
and they were not there on a permanent basis. In the first few years at least, cash-strapped Parish 
Boards and a culture that tended to ignore the importance of public health as an investment  
rather than a burden, meant that the road for IHB men was a difficult one.   
It seemed that the IHB’s fears over Jamaica that had postponed their earlier involvement  
were well founded. Howard, despite his very firm stance on sanitation and adherence to the 
original agreement in his communications with the Jamaican government, privately mused to 
Gardner that they might have to “temporize” and hope that through education and demonstration 
of the treatment campaign, win over the public and government officials to their methods.
38
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Gardner finally left Jamaica in December 1919 to return to the United States and his very 
ill wife. In one of his final letters to Howard he expressed his disappointment with his time in 
Jamaica, feeling as if his work had come to naught in the first demonstration campaign in May 
Pen. He lamented, “… it has seemed to me at times that my best efforts had produced very poor 
results ... It was not a satisfactory piece of work to me and at the same time it was the most 
difficult piece of work I have ever done.”39 With the treatment campaign in the Vere district 
underway and the sanitation left unfinished in May Pen, his replacement, Dr. Benjamin 
Washburn, who arrived in January 1920, was thrust immediately into the controversies and 
challenges faced by his predecessor. 
This detailed account of the many obstacles faced by Gardner, Connor and Howard in 
securing the cooperation of the Jamaican government and the fulfillment of the promises they 
made in 1918, reveals that while many governments were eager for RF money, this did not 
translate automatically into an acceptance of their American public health creed. The RF did not 
simply hand over funds, nor did they take on the burden of permanent programs in public health. 
Rather, IHB officers implemented demonstration campaigns of limited geographical and 
temporal scope in order to win over governments and the public to their vision of the prevention 
of disease through sanitation. While this vision was a worthy one, it failed to recognize the 
dynamics of the local political structure and the cost-counting of the colonial government. The 
resistance encountered by IHB officers in Jamaica, while specific to the local context, elucidates 
many of the obstacles encountered by the RF in its attempt to promote a global vision of public 
health. 
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